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Neuropsychological and cognitive deficits are observed in the majority of persons with
alcohol and drug use disorders and may interfere with treatment processes and outcomes.
Although, on average, the brain and cognition improve with abstinence or markedly reduced
substance use, better understanding of the heterogeneity in the time-course and extent
of cognitive recovery at the individual level is useful to promote bench-to-bedside trans-
lation and inform clinical decision making. This study integrated a variable-centered and a
person-centered approach to characterize diversity in cognitive recovery in 197 patients
in treatment for a substance use disorder. We assessed executive function, verbal abil-
ity, memory, and complex information processing speed at treatment entry, and then 6,
26, and 52 weeks later. Structural equation modeling was used to define underlying ability
constructs and determine the mean level of cognitive changes in the sample while mini-
mizing measurement error and practice effects on specific tests. Individual-level empirical
growth plots of latent factor scores were used to explore prototypical trajectories of cog-
nitive change. At the level of the mean, small to medium effect size gains in cognitive
abilities were observed over 1 year. At the level of the individual, the mean trajectory of
change was also the modal individual recovery trajectory shown by about half the sam-
ple. Other prototypical cognitive change trajectories observed in all four cognitive domains
included Delayed Gain, Loss of Gain, and Continuous Gain. Together these trajectories
encompassed between 86 and 94% of individual growth plots across the four latent abili-
ties. Further research is needed to replicate and predict trajectory membership. Replication
of the present findings would have useful implications for targeted treatment planning and
the new cognitive interventions being developed to enhance treatment outcomes.
Keywords: cognitive recovery, neuropsychological impairment, longitudinal, person-centered, variable-centered,
treatment, substance use disorders, alcohol use disorders
INTRODUCTION
Cognitive impairment is pervasive in persons who enter treatment
for alcohol and other drug use disorders (1, 2) and may compli-
cate treatment processes, disrupt interpersonal relationships, and
undermine behavioral flexibility and control [e.g., Ref. (3, 4)].
Over the past few decades, tremendous progress has been made
in uncovering notable neuroplasticity when substance use stops
or is greatly reduced. There is consistent evidence that multi-
ple domains of cognitive functioning, and their underlying brain
structures and processes, are capable of recovery (5–7). A recent
meta-analysis (8) of the behavioral literature suggested primary
cognitive gains occur during the first month or so following
cessation of use, with more modest gains over 1 year and even
longer term.
A challenge that remains is how to use information about cog-
nitive recovery, or its absence, to guide treatment planning and
develop more effective interventions for the cognitively impaired
patient who enters treatment for a substance use disorder (SUD).
Cognitive recovery in this population has been studied primarily
as changes in the mean levels of cognitive and neuropsycholog-
ical test performance between two points in time. One potential
barrier for bench-to-bedside translation is that group summaries
may obscure differences between individuals in extent and rate
of recovery. The fact that functional relations at the person level
cannot be inferred from averaged data has been well articulated
in experimental psychology for more than half a century [e.g.,
Ref. (9, 10)]. The difficulty is not with the averaged data or curves
themselves, but rather with the tacit assumption that individual
curves, within a range of dispersion, will be of the same form as
the average curve (9). A variety of analytic methods are available
to empirically evaluate whether this assumption holds in any par-
ticular set of data, and if not, whether homogeneous subgroups
of persons can be identified that show different and conceptu-
ally meaningful patterns of change (9, 11–14). Yet, these methods
have not been applied in many areas of behavioral research, lead-
ing in some cases to quite erroneous conclusions about typical
patterns of change in health status over time. A notable exam-
ple comes from research on exposure to trauma, where an early
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focus on psychopathological outcomes and event based compar-
isons obscured understanding of the typical patterns of response
to traumatic (or potentially traumatic) events (15). Bonanno and
colleagues used latent growth curve modeling to show that these
outcomes could be grouped within prototypical longitudinal pat-
terns of resilience, gradual recovery, delayed increases in distress,
and chronic distress, with resilience being the modal trajectory
(16). It was the initial studies from this group that used means
and standard deviations (SDs) to assess normal variability that
established the heterogeneity of outcomes following bereavement
and other potentially traumatic events, and set the stage for sub-
sequent research aimed at identifying predictors of resilience [e.g.,
Ref. (17)].
Similarly, the question arises whether a focus on clinical levels
of neuropsychological impairment, or comparisons of cognitive
ability in SUD and control samples without SUD, has obscured
identification of prototypical trajectories of cognitive change in
treatment samples. The ability to identify, and ultimately pre-
dict, heterogeneous patterns of cognitive change would have useful
implications for clinical decision making, such as the design and
pacing of treatment delivery and the need for follow-up assessment
and provision of continued care. In this article, we address the
inceptive question of whether mean-level improvements observed
in different domains of cognitive ability observed in SUD treat-
ment samples represent the modal trajectories of change at the
level of the person, or whether there are prototypical longitudinal
change patterns that differ substantively in form from the aver-
age pattern of change over time. To accomplish this, we integrated
what have been termed “variable-centered” and “person-centered”
analytic approaches to model mean and person-level cognitive
changes over time. Conceptually, variable-centered approaches
assume that interrelations among variables reflect how variables
function within the person (18). Such approaches, which comprise
the predominant statistical methods for predicting outcomes in
behavioral research, allow strong hypothesis tests about underly-
ing mechanisms (19, 20). In the context of examining cognitive
recovery, the variable-centered approach of structural equation
modeling (SEM), and specifically confirmatory factor analysis
(CFA), is valuable for the goal of predicting how cognitive con-
structs (underlying cognitive abilities) influence their indicators
(performance scores on neuropsychological tests) [see Ref. (21)].
The significance of changes in underlying cognitive abilities over
time can be used to estimate the average level of cognitive recov-
ery following cessation of alcohol and drug use. In comparison, a
person-centered approach views functioning and change from a
more holistic perspective (13). In longitudinal studies, it is used
to characterize change across time within the person and cap-
ture intra-individual dynamics (22). The ultimate goal of most
person-centered analyses is to group individuals into homoge-
neous categories or subgroups and to determine the predictors of
subgroup membership (21).
The present study used a variable-centered model of cognitive
change as a starting point against which to gauge the potential
heterogeneity of change patterns observed at the level of individ-
ual patients in SUD treatment. We built on our previous CFA of
cognitive abilities in a sample of 197 men and women who entered
treatment for an alcohol and/or drug use disorder (23–25). CFA
was used to specify the degree to which an a priori conceptual
model1 of four underlying cognitive ability constructs supported
performance on 15 standardized neuropsychological tests that
assessed the major domains of impairment found in heavy, chronic
users of alcohol and other drugs (27, 28). We showed evidence
of convergent and discriminative validity for underlying ability
constructs termed executive function, memory, verbal ability, and
complex syntactic information processing speed. Six weeks after
treatment entry, participants were again administered the neu-
ropsychological test battery. The four-factor structure observed at
baseline was largely invariant (identical factor pattern and, with
one exception, identical factor loadings) at the 6-week follow up
(24). After accounting for practice effects, as explained below, there
were statistically significant mean improvements in the executive,
verbal, memory, and complex information processing speed latent
constructs across the 6 weeks, consistent with trends in cognitive
recovery observed in earlier studies that used different methods
[reviewed in Ref. (29)]. The average memory improvement was
of medium effect size (ES) (30); improvements in the other three
latent constructs were of small ES.
In the present study, we added two additional neuropsycholog-
ical retests that were conducted in this sample at 26 and 52 weeks
post-treatment entry (25) to determine the average level of changes
in the cognitive abilities over the full 1-year testing interval. We
output latent ability scores for each participant at each of the
four test occasions from the variable-centered analysis in order
to calculate person-centered empirical growth plots (31–33). Two
related aspects of our approach to this problem are noteworthy in
addressing practice effects and model invariance.
One challenge of longitudinal studies involving repeated
administrations of neuropsychological tests is to determine the
relative extent to which changes in test performance over time
represent substantive changes in underlying abilities versus the
influence of factors such as measurement unreliability or practice
with specific tests. Factor loadings represent the degree to which
the underlying ability construct supports performance on each
test, whereas residual terms [also referred to as “specific factors”
(34)] include unique variance of the indicator and measurement
error. To the extent that practice effects are relatively test specific,
the SEM approach allowed practice effects to be partialed out from
“true” improvement in latent abilities. This method of estimat-
ing practice effects is an alternative to the use of control groups,
offsetting of initial testing, and alterative versions of the tests
(35). Although none of these approaches is perfect, the strategy
of separating common and specific factors more fully utilizes the
strengths of SEM and provides a convergent approach to the more
commonly employed methods to control for practice. A related
consideration is whether the underlying abilities that supported
performance during earlier test administrations are the same as or
different from the abilities that were called upon when the tests
were performed later (i.e., for the third and fourth time). Tests of
1Two exceptions were that: (1) performance on visual motor tests was not supported
by a unique latent factor but rather covaried strongly with executive performance,
as has previously been found (26), and (2) the two syntactic information process-
ing speed measures did not vary with the other verbal ability tests but rather were
indicators of a unique complex verbal information processing speed factor.
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invariance of common factor loadings across time were used to
examine the extent to which the same underlying latent abilities
supported test performance at each testing occasion.
The empirical growth plots of latent construct scores were used
to characterize change in cognitive abilities within individuals
over the 1-year time span. Change over time can vary in terms
of direction, rate, and shape of trajectories as well as in min-
ima and maxima (36). With respect to expected cognitive changes
in SUD treatment samples, the previous literature suggests sev-
eral hypothetical subgroups of growth plots of cognitive change
that may be expected to occur with some frequency in the SUD
treatment population [e.g., Ref. (35, 37)]. The average trajectory
of change over 1 year would be expected to reflect substantive
gains in cognitive ability during the initial weeks of abstinence
and treatment, followed by continued, yet smaller improvements
extending over 1 year (38, 39). Such trajectories would comprise
persons showing mild to severe cognitive deficits at treatment
entry, primarily related to direct (neurotoxic), and indirect (e.g.,
medical problems) alcohol and drug effects that would be expected
to remediate with abstinence or greatly reduced substance use.
This trajectory is consistent with the average group-level improve-
ment observed in previous studies (38, 39). Given that not all
individuals show cognitive impairments at treatment entry (40,
41), another prototypical trajectory may reflect average to high
stable levels of cognitive abilities over time. Another type of sta-
ble trajectory may reflect the consistently lower ability levels of
persons who remain impaired across time despite cessation of sub-
stance use, including those with more persistent substance-related
impairment or premorbid cognitive deficits. In addition, a trajec-
tory indicative of impairment at treatment entry that remediates
in the short term, but then reemerges later in time, due to the
resumption of substance use or other intervening factors would
be expected (42).
Combining variable-centered and person-centered quantitative
approaches enabled us to compare the extent to which cognitive
change trajectories of individual patients primarily reflected the
averaged cognitive changes that were observed in the sample at
large, or whether prototypical subgroups of individual-level tra-
jectories emerged that represent alternative patterns of change.
The results provide an empirical foundation for future research
aimed at identifying predictors of subgroups of individuals who
are relatively homogeneous with respect to cognitive recovery and
different from persons in other groups (21, 31).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
One hundred ninety-seven participants (79 women) volunteered
to take part in a multi-site addiction treatment study. Treatment
sites included two private, hospital-based treatment programs,
which offered residential or intensive day treatment (N = 119),
a day treatment program for older adults with alcohol problems
(N = 47), and brief interventions offered to patients who screened
positive for SUD in an urban medical center (N = 31). Exclusion
criteria were being <18 years of age (except for the older adult
program which had a lower age limit of 60 years), Korsakoff ’s syn-
drome, severe dementia, history of organic brain dysfunction or
psychotic disorder, serious medical issues that precluded testing,
methadone-maintenance treatment, and an inability to read test
materials.
All participants met Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, third edition, revised [DSM-III-R; (43)] criteria, which
was current at the start of data collection, for a current psychoac-
tive SUD. Demographic and substance use characteristics have
been previously described in detail (24). In brief, the participants
averaged 43.25 (SD= 17.01) years of age, with 12.94 (SD= 2.71)
years of education. Sixty five percent identified as Caucasian, 26%
as African American, 5% as Hispanic/Latino, and 3% as other. Sixty
one percent were employed and 47% married. Medical problems
were present in 70.2% of the sample. A sole alcohol use disorder
was present in 64% of the sample, a sole drug use disorder in 17%,
and the remainder had dual SUD diagnoses. Of those with drug
use disorders, cocaine use was reported most commonly, followed
by opiate use and marijuana use. The mean full scale Wechsler
Adult Intelligence Scale – Revised (44) IQ score estimated from
the Shipley Institute of Living Scale (45) was 105.63 (SD= 13.27).
MEASURES
Fifteen reliable and valid neuropsychological tests were adminis-
tered at treatment entry as well as during 6-, 26-, and 52-week
follow ups. The test selection rationale and psychometric proper-
ties of these tests are described in (23, 24). The specific tests, as
well as the sample’s mean performance scores for each test at the
four assessment times, are presented in Table 1.
PROCEDURES
Testing was conducted in compliance with National Institutes of
Health guidelines for ethical treatment of human subjects and
approved by the Rutgers Institutional Review Board for the Pro-
tection of Human Subjects in Research. The neuropsychological
assessments were completed using standardized procedures as
a component of core assessment battery of a multi-site addic-
tion treatment study. Participants were tested on-site by the same
group of interviewers, who were re-evaluated every 6 months to
prevent method drift in standardized assessment methods. Partic-
ipants provided informed consent and were tested approximately
1 week following treatment entry (1 week window), and then were
retested 6, 26, and 52 weeks after treatment entry. Each participant
was given the same battery of tests that had been administered
on treatment entry as well as the Timeline Follow-Back Interview
(46). Zero blood alcohol concentration was confirmed at each
assessment occasion by means of breath analysis.
DATA ANALYSIS
The present results are based on the full sample of 197 partici-
pants. Potential bias due to attrition was reduced by estimating
model parameters from a full information covariance matrix and
maximum likelihood approach with missing data assumed to be
missing at random [MAR; (47)] within the Mplus (48) frame-
work. When data are MAR, the variability of SEM-based para-
meter estimates from sample to sample is less than that obtained
when incomplete cases are deleted; to the extent that the MAR
assumption is violated, all estimates are biased but those that are
SEM-based may be less so (20, 49, 50).
We estimated whether the MAR assumption was valid in this
data set. Of a total of 11,820 possible data points with complete
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Table 1 | Performance on component tests of the neuropsychological assessment battery at treatment entry and at each follow up.
Neuropsychological test Treatment entry 6-week follow up 26-week follow up 52-week follow up
N M SD N M SD N M SD N M SD
Shipley Institute of Living Scale, Vocabularya 196 27.5 6.6 158 28.1 6.3 119 28.2 6.4 123 28.3 6.6
Shipley Institute of Living Scale, Abstractiona 196 20.0 10.1 161 21.6 10.0 143 21.6 10.5 140 22.6 10.2
Word Fluency Testa 195 34.7 12.4 162 37.7 13.5 142 37.5 12.3 139 38.2 13.2
Active-Passive Test, affirmative syntaxb 193 2.7 1.0 158 2.5 0.9 136 2.4 0.9 135 2.3 0.8
Active-Passive Test, negative syntaxb 193 3.8 1.7 158 3.3 1.4 136 3.3 1.5 135 3.1 1.3
Booklet Category Testd* 196 72.3 30.7 155 58.5 31.5 128 53.1 30.7 119 47.4 28.8
Stroop Color-Word Testa,c 162 34.9 12.5 135 39.4 12.3 118 40.1 12.8 115 42.0 13.5
Wisconsin Card Sorting Teste 161 5.6 6.2 132 5.0 6.3 95 4.3 5.0 104 3.9 5.0
Digit Symbol Substitution Testa 166 47.2 15.7 136 50.4 16.1 120 50.7 16.2 101 53.1 16.4
Trail Making Test, Part Ab 196 37.6 21.3 162 34.5 18.9 145 33.3 17.9 143 34.3 21.9
Trail Making Test, Part Bb 195 101.3 72.0 160 91.7 58.4 142 91.7 65.5 141 85.9 59.3
California Verbal Learning Testa, 190 9.0 3.5 158 10.3 3.4 145 10.8 3.6 137 10.9 3.6
Product Recall Testa 196 8.0 3.3 161 10.3 2.8 142 10.6 2.8 141 9.9 3.3
Digit Symbol Substitution Test, symbols recalleda 166 5.2 2.8 137 6.0 2.8 119 6.1 2.8 116 6.3 2.9
Tower of Hanoib 166 125.0 88.2 136 88.9 66.4 116 78.8 57.7 116 78.6 58.4
aNumber correct,
btime,
cparticipants were screened for color blindness,
derrors,
eperseveration errors.
*The brief version of this test was used (78).
These data represent a combined mean from the highly correlated long and short delay trials of the CVLT.This mean was then used as a measure of verbal memory
in the structural equation model.
follow ups (197 subjects, 4 occasions, 15 cognitive variables), 1.85,
6.57, 10.94, and 10.89% of data points were missing at test times
1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. Logistic regressions were used to deter-
mine for each cognitive test score whether the occurrence of a
missing value could be predicted by the subject’s mean score on
that variable across non-missing occasions. Of a total of 60 logistic
regressions (4 occasions, 15 variables), only 10 were significant at
p< 0.05. The pattern of results suggested that missing data on two
executive function tests (Stroop, Booklet Category) and one mem-
ory test (Product Recall) were associated with worse performance
on those tests. However, all odds ratios were close to 1 indicating
that violations of the MAR assumption were not problematic in
this data set.
In the variable-centered stage of analysis, we examined whether
the latent structure of cognitive abilities at treatment entry was
equivalent across four points in time within the first year after
treatment entry, and whether there were significant changes in the
means of latent factor abilities over the first year post-treatment
entry. Changes in latent means are suggestive of cognitive recovery
and changes in the intercepts of manifest test scores suggest prac-
tice and other effects that were unique to each of the individual
neuropsychological tests.
Our previous CFA at treatment entry yielded a four-factor
model (executive functioning, memory, verbal ability, and com-
plex information processing speed) of cognitive abilities that
exhibited convergent and discriminant validity (23). In this study,
we examined the possibility of systematic differences in cognitive
status at treatment entry between participants recruited from the
different treatment sites using general linear models performed
separately on raw scores from each neuropsychological test. The
variance accounted for by recruitment site was in no case signif-
icant (all ps> 0.05) after variance attributable to age and gender
was taken into account (23). We further observed primary factor
invariance and significant increases in latent factor ability means
at the 6-week follow up (24). In the present study, we extended this
CFA to examine factor invariance and changes in factor means at
the 26- and 52-week follow ups.
First, to test whether the underlying cognitive construct that
supported performance on each of the 15 tests remained stable,
the equivalence of the factor loadings (the extent to which per-
formance on an individual test was supported by a given latent
ability construct) was assessed across the four assessment occa-
sions. The ability to hold a given factor loading to be invariant
across time without causing a significant increment in model misfit
(significant increment in chi-square) indicates that the underlying
cognitive abilities supporting performance on a given test were sta-
ble over time and that the indicators remained reliable indicators of
the underlying construct. Second, cognitive recovery at the group
level was defined by statistically significant increases in the means
of the latent ability factors across time. To help gauge whether sta-
tistically significant increases in cognitive performance may be of
clinical significance (i.e., likelihood of functional improvements in
clients’ ability to learn, retain, or utilize treatment related informa-
tion), ES measurements were calculated as SDs of change (51). ES
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differences of 0.2–0.5 were considered small, 0.5–0.8 medium, and
0.8 or greater large. We note however, that this standard has been
suggested when considering changes in manifest test scores, which
include measurement error; changes in latent construct scores are
more sensitive indicators of real change because these scores are
not conflated with measurement error and unique measurement
effects. Thus, interpretations of clinical significance from standard
ESs are conservative.
To account for the influence of repeated administrations of the
same neuropsychological tests on performance, the statistical fit
of models that held the intercepts of the 15 neuropsychological
test scores constant across time was tested. Intercepts of mani-
fest variables would be expected to increase as a result practice
effects rather than changes associated with underlying abilities.
This interpretation is supported by the consistent lack of evidence
in the literature for generalization of training effects across dif-
ferent tests. Intercepts of each manifest test score were initially
constrained across all four time-points and significant model mis-
fit was identified by statistically significant modification indices.
An inability to constrain a given intercept across two time-points
without adversely affecting model fit pointed to the likelihood
of performance facilitation due to practice effects or influence of
cognitive processes other than the four latent ability constructs
represented in the model. Conversely, intercepts that could be
constrained without significantly altering model fit suggested that
individual test scores co-varied with the means of the underlying
latent factors.
The person-centered stage of analysis began by using the best-
fitting longitudinal CFA model to estimate four latent factor scores
for each participant at each assessment occasion using MPlus
software. Next, we used empirical growth plots and temporally
sequenced graphs of the latent factor scores (12) to describe each
participant’s pattern of change over time. Because the growth plots
were generated using latent ability scores output from the variable-
centered CFA, it was assumed that they were not confounded with
measurement error or unique aspects of individual test perfor-
mance, and thus more closely reflected true change in underlying
ability levels compared to manifest test scores.
Next we explored the prevalence of distinct cognitive change
trajectories (prototypical subgroups) by using SDs of the group’s
mean-level changes between consecutive assessment occasions
(T2–T1; T3–T2; T4–T3). For each of the four latent ability con-
structs, we classified each participant’s change score as 2, 1, or
0 depending on whether the person’s change score was >1 SD
above the mean, within ±1 SD from the mean, or >1 SD below
the sample’s mean level of change, respectively. This procedure
generated 27 (i.e., 3!) possible change patterns across time. For
example, pattern 1 1 1 characterized the change pattern of an indi-
vidual who did not deviate from the average pattern of change
by more than 1 SD over time; the pattern 0 2 1 characterized a
delayed pattern of cognitive gains wherein an individual showed
less improvement (>1 SD) than the average during treatment, but
greater than average improvement (>1 SD) at a later assessment.
The 1 SD cut-off was chosen to allow for a reasonable disper-
sion of trajectories of the same approximate level and form as
the average (expected heterogeneity). We then identified alterna-
tive change patterns that were exhibited by 5% or more of the
sample and categorized trajectories based on commonalities in
change patterns. This exploratory method of characterizing pro-
totypical subgroups of change was used in lieu of latent growth
mixture modeling or other more powerful technique due to power
limitations and the occurrence of partial factorial invariance, as
described in Section “Results.”
RESULTS
LONGITUDINAL MODEL OF LATENT COGNITIVE ABILITIES OVER 1 YEAR
The final, partially constrained four factor model is presented
in Figure 1. The strength of the loadings of each neuropsycho-
logical test on the four latent factors is shown on the arrows
extending from the latent factors to the test indicators. The
identified model was generally consistent with that previously
reported for the first two time-points (23, 24). Although the χ2
was significant (χ2= 2494.035, df= 1543, p= 0.0000), all other fit
indices (RMSEA= 0.056, 90% CI= 0.052–0.060, SRMR= 0.065,
CFI= 0.916, TLI= 0.903) suggested an adequate fit of the model
to the data (52, 53).
Performance on the neuropsychological tests was, in most cases,
supported by the same underlying latent cognitive abilities at
each of the four time-points. Partial measurement variance was
observed (50). Fifty-six of the 88 factor loadings could be con-
strained to identity across the four assessment occasions, 12 could
be constrained across 3 assessments, and 12 constrained across 2
assessments (Figure 1) without decreasing model fit. There were
two violations of factor configural or pattern invariance (54).
Specifically, results suggested that the complex information pro-
cessing speed construct was only a determinant of Wisconsin Card
Sorting performance at treatment entry. In contrast, Trail Making
Test, Part B performance was more influenced by complex pro-
cessing speed than by executive function (set shifting, cognitive
flexibility) at the fourth measurement occasion. Convergent valid-
ity was assessed by testing whether each indicator’s coefficient on
its purported latent construct was greater than twice its standard
error (55). Validity was supported in 78 of 88 cases; the 10 excep-
tions represented a weakening of secondary loadings over time,
rather than a change in the nature of underlying factors. Discrimi-
nant validity was tested by constraining the correlations of factors
to 1.0 and performingχ2 tests on values from the constrained and
unconstrained models (55). All tests were significant, supporting
discriminant validity.
PRACTICE EFFECTS
To examine improvements related to repeated exposure to the
test materials, the across time invariance of the intercepts of each
neuropsychological test was examined. The intercepts of individ-
ual neuropsychological tests were initially constrained across all
four time-points, and then freed based on model misfit. Ten of
the 15 neuropsychological test intercepts could be constrained to
identity across all four time-points without diminishing model fit.
Five tests showed evidence of practice effects between the baseline
and 6-week follow-up assessments: Product Recall, Stroop Color-
Word Test, Booklet Category Test, Tower of Hanoi, and Wisconsin
Card Sorting Test. The intercepts of Stroop, Tower of Hanoi, and
Wisconsin Card Sorting could be constrained to identity across
the remaining three test times. For the Booklet Category Test,
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FIGURE 1 | Partially constrained longitudinal measurement model of 15
neuropsychological tests at four testing times during the first year after
treatment entry. Latent factors, labeled executive, memory, verbal, and
complex information processing speed (speed), are located on the left side of
the diagram. Residual variances for the indicators at each of the four
time-points are in the small ovals on the right side of the diagram.
Neuropsychological tests (indicators), shown in squares, included the Stroop
Color and Word (STROOP), Booklet Category (BCT), Wisconsin Card Sort
(WCS), Tower of Hanoi (TOH), Shipley Institute of Living Scale, Abstraction
(SILSA), Word Fluency (FAS), Trail Making Test, Parts A and B (TMTA, TMTB),
Shipley Institute of Living Scale, Vocabulary (SILSV), Digit Symbol
Substitution, number correct (DSS) and Incidental Memory (INCID),
Active-Passive Voice, Affirmative (AFIRM) and Negative (NEG) Syntax,
California Verbal Learning (CVLT), Product Recall (RECALL). Arrows extending
from latent means to indicators show factor loadings at the four test times.
With respect to invariance of factor loadings, of the potential 88 unique
loadings (22 loadings over 4 test times), 56 were constrained to identity
across 4 test times, 12 were constrained to identity across 3 test times, and
12 were constrained to identity across 2 test times without diminishing
model fit. There were no violations of pattern invariance for executive, verbal,
and memory factors. For speed factor, there was one unique loading at
treatment entry and 1 at 52 weeks. +Loadings constrained across all four test
times; A: loadings constrained across 6, 26, and 52 weeks; B loadings
constrained across treatment entry and the 6- and 26-week test times;
C loadings constrained between treatment entry and the 6-week test time as
well as between the 26- and 52-week test times.
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only the 26- and 52-week assessment intercepts were able to be
constrained, indicating that changes in test performance between
baseline, 6 and 26 weeks were influenced by repeated test exposure
and practice effects. In addition, only the intercepts of the 6- and
26-week assessment of the Product Recall Test were constrained
in the best-fitting model, suggesting practice effects were in play
between the first two assessments as well as between the third and
fourth exposure to the test.
MEAN-LEVEL COGNITIVE CHANGES
The majority of gains in the executive (M = 0.00, 0.48, 0.53, 0.66),
speed (M = 0.00, 0.55, 0.54, 0.68), memory (M = 0.000, 0.87, 1.11,
1.13), and verbal (M = 0.00, 0.23, 0.23, 0.31) cognitive domains
was observed between treatment entry and the 6-week follow up,
with smaller additional gains over time. Figure 2 (thick black line)
shows cognitive recovery at the level of the mean as estimated
by comparing the mean scores of the latent factors at sequential
time-points in relation to the SD.
PERSON-LEVEL COGNITIVE CHANGES
The number of participants exhibiting empirical growth plots cat-
egorized by the 27 possible cognitive change trajectories is shown
in Table 2 for each of the four latent ability constructs. It is note-
worthy that the mean change trajectory also was the modal change
trajectory (i.e., 1 1 1) comprising 54, 45, 47, and 56% of the
individual growth plots of executive, memory, verbal, and com-
plex processing speed, respectively. For the latent executive ability
factor, an additional 7% demonstrated a 1 1 0 trajectory (i.e., paral-
leling the group trajectory from baseline to 26 weeks, but showing
less than average change from 26 to 52 weeks) and 6% demon-
strated a 1 2 1 trajectory (i.e., paralleling the group trajectory
except for a higher than average change from 6 to 26 weeks). No
other trajectory group included more than 5% of the sample. For
the latent memory factor, 7% demonstrated a 0 1 1 trajectory, indi-
cating a less than average gain during treatment; 5% showed a 1
0 1 and 5% showed a 1 1 0 trajectory suggesting one period of
less than average change after treatment completion. Further, 9%
showed a 1 1 2 trajectory and 7% showed a 2 1 1 trajectory, indi-
cating one period of greater than average change. For the latent
verbal factor, four additional trajectories included >5% of the
sample: 0 1 1, 1 0 1, 1 0 2, 2 1 1. For the latent speed factor, one
trajectory (1 0 1) contained 6% of the sample; all other trajectories
included <5%.
To identify prototypical change patterns, differences in level of
ability were removed by subtracting each individual’s latent factor
score at treatment entry from his/her latent factor score at each of
the test occasions. Each participant’s empirical growth curve then
was plotted by trajectory group. In addition to the modal change
pattern, three prototypical change patterns were identified across
all ability constructs: Delayed Gain, Loss of Gain, and Continuous
Gain. Table 2 shows which trajectories were grouped within these
prototypical change patterns. Figure 2 shows these prototypical
change patterns separately for each of the four latent ability con-
structs. The thick black line represents the mean (and modal)
trajectory of change in each figure. The Delayed Gain groups
(Figure 2, left column) include trajectories of less than average
improvement during treatment followed by a cognitive gain at the
26- and/or 52-week assessments. Thus, although individual trajec-
tories may have differed in terms of the timing of cognitive gains
or losses experienced after treatment, all showed an absence of the
increase in cognitive ability most commonly experienced between
treatment entry and 6 weeks (i.e., compared to thick black line).
The Loss of Gain groups (Figure 2, middle column) include tra-
jectories of average to greater than average cognitive improvement
during treatment that is fully or partially reversed later in time.
Finally, the Continuous Gain groups (Figure 2, right column)
include trajectories of average to greater than average cognitive
increases between all test times.
With respect to the hypothesized patterns of cognitive change,
the growth plot analyses supported the prototypical trajectory of
substantive increases in ability during the first 6 weeks following
treatment entry, followed by smaller gains extending over 1 year.
Thus, the mean trajectory characterized about half of participants’
individual growth plots. In addition, the expected trajectories
demonstrating a loss of gain was found, and accounted for approx-
imately 11–13% of the sample for each ability. In contrast, little evi-
dence was found to support the hypothesized trajectories of stable
functioning across time, either at high or low ability levels. Rather,
virtually all growth plots represented dynamic changes in underly-
ing abilities over time. Further, unexpected, yet common trajecto-
ries (categorized as Delayed Gain) suggested lack of improvement
in cognitive ability during treatment, followed by delayed gains in
abilities at later assessment times. These trajectories accounted for
8, 15, 12, and 7% of the sample in terms of the latent executive,
memory, verbal, and syntactic speed factors, respectively. Finally,
17, 22, 14, and 14% of the sample showed consistent and sustained
improvements in function that exceeded expected levels in latent
executive, memory, verbal, and complex information processing
speed factors, respectively. Overall, the modal and four alternative
change groups identified accounted for 90% of the trajectories
observed for the latent executive factor, 94% of memory trajecto-
ries, 86% of verbal trajectories, and 88% of speed trajectories.
DISCUSSION
The present study integrated variable-centered and person-
centered analytic approaches to capitalize on the unique strengths
of each method for understanding of diversity in cognitive changes
patterns across a 1-year time span following treatment entry for
SUD. The use of CFA to identify underlying cognitive abilities had
the advantage of quantitatively examining the fit of an a priori con-
ceptual model to the data (56) and its stability over time (57). The
person-centered approach captured intra-individual dynamics of
cognitive changes that occur at the level of the individual and
allowed us to examine the extent to which individual empirical
growth plots generally conformed to the average trajectory of cog-
nitive gains observed in the sample as a whole, or could be catego-
rized into representative groups that displayed distinctive patterns
of cognitive change. The use of latent ability factor scores in the
empirical growth plots decreased the likelihood that the shape of
these plots was unduly affected by fluctuations resulting from mea-
surement error and test-specific effects, although caveats related
to partial factorial invariance are discussed later in this section.
The group-level analyses revealed average cognitive increases
in a sample of adults with alcohol and other drug use disorders
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FIGURE 2 | Prototypical patterns of cognitive change in latent executive
(A), memory (B), verbal (C), and complex information processing speed
(D). In addition to the modal pattern of cognitive change (thick black line in all
panels), three consistent patterns of change were observed across all latent
factors. The left column depicts trajectories (010, 011, 012, 020, and 021) that
show delayed gain.The middle column depicts trajectories (100, 110, 120, 200,
201, 210, and 220) that show early gains that are subsequently partially or
fully reversed. The right column depicts trajectories (022, 112, 121, 122, 212,
221, and 222) that show continued gain throughout the first year of recovery.
For each panel, data from one individual in each trajectory group are shown.
Some trajectories were not observed for each latent factor (seeTable 1). To
maintain consistency in scale across panels, some trajectory examples
include data points outside of the y -axis range (e.g., the latent memory and
speed, continuous gain group). Note that the scale of latent scores is different
for the speed factor (D) versus all other factors. BL, baseline/treatment entry;
6W, 6-week follow up; 26W, 26-week follow up; 52W, 52-week follow up.
between SUD treatment entry and 52 weeks later. The magni-
tude of the group-level increases across the first 6 weeks suggested
recovery of small ES in the domains of executive functioning, com-
plex information processing speed, and verbal ability. The mean
increase in memory was of medium ES, suggesting greater likeli-
hood of clinical significance. Some continuing gains were noted
across the domains at 26 and 52 weeks, but were relatively smaller
in magnitude. Nonetheless, the finding of significant improvement
in latent ability constructs at the level of the group is noteworthy,
especially in light of the fact that cognitive dysfunction was not
an intervention target in the SUD treatments from which par-
ticipants were recruited and that ES measurements of changes
in latent constructs, versus individual test scores, are likely to be
conservative.
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Table 2 | Changes in latent factor scores categorized by deviation from
group mean.
Executive
(%)
Memory
(%)
Verbal
(%)
Syntactic
speed (%)
Trajectory group
designation
0 0 0 2 1 0 0 None
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 None
0 0 2 1 0 1 2 None
0 1 0 1 2 0 1 Delayed gain
0 1 1 4 7 5 4 Delayed gain
0 1 2 1 1 2 1 Delayed gain
0 2 0 2 2 2 1 Delayed gain
0 2 1 1 4 4 2 Delayed gain
0 2 2 0 1 0 0 None
1 0 0 1 2 0 0 Loss of gain
1 0 1 4 5 5 6 None
1 0 2 3 0 7 2 None
1 1 0 7 5 3 4 Loss of gain
1 1 1 54 45 47 56 Normative gain
1 1 2 5 9 4 3 Continuous gain
1 2 0 1 1 4 4 Loss of gain
1 2 1 6 3 5 4 Continuous gain
1 2 2 0 1 0 0 Continuous gain
2 0 0 0 2 1 0 Loss of gain
2 0 1 0 3 2 1 Loss of gain
2 0 2 1 1 1 2 None
2 1 0 1 1 4 2 Loss of gain
2 1 1 4 7 6 4 Continuous gain
2 1 2 3 2 0 1 Continuous gain
2 2 0 1 1 1 1 Loss of gain
2 2 1 0 0 0 2 Continuous gain
2 2 2 0 0 0 1 Continuous gain
Change trajectories were created by subtracting individual’s latent scores at one
test time from his/her scores at the prior test time. Scores were then coded as 0
(>1 SD below the group mean), 1 (within 1 SD of the group mean), or 2 (>1 SD
above the group mean) for T2–T1, T3–T2, T4–T3. Trajectories were then grouped
based on commonalities in empirical growth curve patterns.
As previously observed (24), the latent ability factors were
highly correlated between successive assessment times, indicating
that the rank ordering of individuals within the sample was rel-
atively stable. However, summarizing the bivariate relationships
between sequential testing occasions conveys little information
about how or in what direction each person changes over time
(12). To assess these person-centered changes, we created empirical
growth plots for each participant. The plots showed that whereas
many participants exhibited cognitive increases that were con-
sistent with changes in the sample’s mean, a sizable number of
participants showed trajectories that deviated from the average
pattern. Of the 27 possible change trajectories for each latent fac-
tor, 21 different trajectories were noted for both the executive and
memory factors, 18 for complex processing speed, and 22 for the
verbal factor. Thus, not only did a large proportion of partici-
pant’s cognitive change trajectories differ from the modal trajec-
tory, the manner in which they differed varied. We were able to
qualitatively categorize different trajectories into four prototypical
change patterns: modal gain, delayed gain, loss of gain, or contin-
uous gain. The prototypical modal gain trajectory accounted for
45–56% of individual trajectories. Together, the three non-modal
change prototypes accounted for an additional 32–49% of the
trajectories in latent factor scores. Although these change proto-
types did not contain a perfectly homogeneous set of trajectories,
they demonstrated commonalities among change trajectories that
may be useful for understanding the bi-directional relationship
between cognitive abilities and substance use.
Differences between cognitive domains were evident in the
individual plots. For verbal ability, the plots showed that for
most individuals, the overall pattern of change was very subtle
and even changes in the Continuous Gains prototype were not
remarkable. This is consistent with the lifespan developmental lit-
erature suggesting that crystallized verbal ability tends to increase,
or not dramatically decrease, across the lifespan (58, 59), and with
the addiction literature showing that crystallized verbal ability is
more resistant to alcohol and drug effects than are fluid cogni-
tive skills (60, 61). In the other three cognitive domains, the rate
and shape of change within prototypical change groups over 1 year
showed more differences across individuals. That some individuals
demonstrated lower scores at the 6-week follow-up (immediately
after treatment) compared to baseline was unexpected, but may
suggest that a subgroup of patients requires additional time to
experience the cognitive benefits of sobriety or that contextual
factors following treatment may, in some cases, promote cognitive
recovery.
The ultimate goal of person-centered analyses is to group indi-
viduals into categories, such that each group comprises persons
who are similar to each other and different from persons in other
groups (21). The description of empirical growth plots provided
by the present study provides hypotheses for future studies that
integrate variable-centered and person-centered methods to test
hypothetical mechanisms that may vary across groups who show
differing trajectories of cognitive ability and cognitive recovery.
That 6–14% of the sample could not be classified within any of
the prototypical change groups points to one of the limitations of
the trajectory grouping strategy employed in this study. Although
we relied on prospective means and SDs to define trajectories, our
use of a 1 SD to define a heterogeneity cut-off was arbitrary in that
it imposed pre-defined limits on individual-level data rather that
allowing trajectories to emerge (16). The next logical step will be
to use the analytic algorithms available to test models that com-
bine class and continuous variables such as latent class growth
analysis, latent class cluster analysis, growth mixture modeling,
and model-based cluster analysis (48, 62, 63). These methods
may prove useful to develop a more personalized approach to
cognitive intervention, especially if constellations or patterns of
cognitive abilities contribute to behavioral outcomes primarily via
the dynamic role they play within the total functioning of the
individual [e.g., Ref. (31, 64)].
An important question for future research is whether predictors
of different courses of cognitive impairment and recovery can be
identified. Our previous study of this sample identified increas-
ing age, less education, and poor medical status as robust and
generalized correlates of ability levels at treatment entry, whereas
diagnoses of drug use disorders, childhood behavior problems,
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familial alcoholism, and psychopathology showed small, unique
relations to specific latent abilities (23). These risk factors for
impairment were generally consistent with those identified in ear-
lier studies (26, 29, 65), and together, explained between 34 and
57% of the true variance in the four latent ability constructs at
treatment entry. Predictors of impairment are not necessarily pre-
dictors of recovery, and indeed we found this to be the case in
explaining gains in abilities that patients had made by 6 weeks
(24). Substance use between treatment entry and 6 weeks, and a
few additional risk factors were modestly predictive of less recov-
ery, however, they had small, unique ESs. It is possible that because
the etiology of cognitive impairment in SUD treatment samples is
quite varied (e.g., direct neurotoxic effects, indirect effects medi-
ated by medical disorders and nutrition, traumatic brain injury
resulting from increased likelihood of accidental falls, and many
others), the predictors of cognitive recovery may also be varied,
with individual factors explaining small amounts of unique vari-
ance. Likewise, it may be that because patterns of recovery (or
absence of recovery) vary, as illustrated by the prototypical change
patterns in this study, identifying group-level predictors of cog-
nitive recovery may be difficult in a heterogeneous sample, but
improved if subgroups of recovery are identified. Environmen-
tal and contextual factors both within and outside of treatment
that may promote recovery have received little attention, yet may
be important; this is supported by the identification of a pro-
totypical pattern of change that showed little recovery (and, in
some cases, further impairment) during treatment but cognitive
improvements following treatment.
The approach to generating person-centered trajectories in the
present investigation was exploratory do in part to sample size lim-
itations. A larger sample would have allowed for sufficiently sized
subsamples who exhibited specific drug use disorders alone or in
addition to alcohol use disorders. Drugs such cocaine and opiates
have distinct targets within the brain and may have affect cogni-
tive impairment and recovery in differing ways (66, 67). Further,
the present sample included persons from three treatment sites.
Although this might be considered a strength in improving the
ability to generalize results, it was also a limitation in increasing
sample heterogeneity. In a larger sample, these sources of hetero-
geneity could be modeled and invariance across different SUDs
and treatment groups could be explicitly tested. In addition, we did
not have sufficient power to characterize the influence of different
psychoactive medications on impairment. As psychopharmaco-
logical treatments for SUD and their common comorbid disorders
increase (68, 69), integrated bio-behavioral research is needed to
determine their facilitative or disruptive cognitive effects.
Our observations regarding individual trajectories of change
are tempered because we did not find full invariance of factor
structure over time. Modeling longitudinal changes in behavior
assumes that the same construct is measured in the same metric
at each assessment time (54). This assumption can be violated
whether one is using a manifest scale score or a latent factor score.
For example, simply administering the same test on multiple occa-
sions does not insure that the same underlying ability is being
assessed, as is often assumed when manifest test scores are ana-
lyzed. In a latent variable modeling, such as in the present study,
factor invariance, as measured by constraining factor loadings and
intercepts to be identical across time is the statistical ideal to ensure
that the nature of the construct is not changing across assessment
occasions (54). At the same time, these statistical considerations
need to be weighed against the conceptual model of the constructs
being studied. Thus, intercept invariance over time could not be
accommodated in the present model due to practice effects that
occur. Note, however, that these practice effects were captured
as changes in the intercepts of the specific factors, not changes
observed in the latent ability constructs. Whereas there was only
one violation of factor loading invariance between treatment entry
and 6 weeks in this sample (24), there were additional changes
when the longitudinal model extended over 26 and 52 weeks. In
the majority of cases, these changes represented a weakening of
the latent construct in explaining task performance and were typi-
cally of small magnitude. The present results showed, for example,
that variance in performance on the Wisconsin Card Sort Test
was somewhat less explained by underlying executive functions
at later assessment occasions. Such results were not entirely unex-
pected given the complexity of the present CFA and the occurrence
of secondary factor loadings. Future research may benefit from
employing less complex characterizations of cognitive abilities
to increase the likelihood of measurement invariance over time.
Finally, the population studied and the timing of planned assess-
ments was designed to capture a dynamic time span wherein the
likelihood of neurocognitive recovery, reorganization, and com-
pensatory processes was high [e.g., Ref. (70)]. Thus, whereas
model invariance may be ideal for statistically assessing changes
in cognitive ability, identification of factorial variance also could
conceivably be relevant for understanding compensatory cognitive
processes that support recovery.
The present study did not focus on cognitive impairment
defined by clinical cut-off scores per se. As expected on the basis of
previous studies of addiction treatment samples, however, approx-
imately 70% of the sample was clinically impaired on one or more
of the tests at treatment entry (60, 71). Although it still remains
to be determined whether cognitive facilitation techniques in
addiction treatment should be targeted only to those who have
serious levels of cognitive impairment (7), one conclusion from
the present results is that almost all persons in the sample showed
some extent of cognitive gains during or after treatment. This
implies that in the absence of premorbid cognitive ability infor-
mation, it is likely that most persons enter treatment with reduced
ability relative to their own premorbid status, and thus may expe-
rience gains due to cessation of substance use, indirect influences
such as associated improvements in health, and indirect treatment
effects. Results are also consistent with the suggestion that there
may be value to SUD treatment development in exploring a broad
range of approaches to neurocognitive facilitation and rehabili-
tation. A resurgence of interest in creating cognitive adjuncts to
addiction treatment approaches include techniques to rehabilitate
or facilitate cognitive functions by training working memory and
other executive and memory functions (72–74), and alternatively,
to bolster non-cognitive emotion regulation functions that may
indirectly improve cognitive control (25, 75).
Individual growth plot approaches have proved useful in other
research areas, but have not been applied to the question of cogni-
tive deficit and recovery during and following addiction treatment.
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Findings that change processes underlying positive treatment out-
comes operated differently in persons with and without executive
function impairment (3, 60, 76, 77) suggest that it may be use-
ful to distinguish between individuals who vary systematically in
cognitive recovery. This should lead to better understanding the
operation of different behavioral change processes within these
groups, and to facilitate more effective, personalized treatment
approaches.
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